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Abstract: The study of a decentralized coalition formation 
scheme in a specific power systems transmission expansion sce- 
nario is the purpose of this paper. We define first who are the 
agents in the t:xpansion game and provide a decentralized coali- 
tion scheme based on Bilateral Shapley values. Finally, we allo- 
cate the total costs of expansion amongst the agents, based on the 
coalition history, and we compare our method with a centralized 
scheme. 
Keywords: Transmission planning, power systems, cooperative 
g;ame theory, multi-agent systems 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Power systems transmission planning addresses the prob- 
lem of determining the optimal number of lines that 
should be added to an existing network to supply the fore- 
casted load as economically as possible, subject to operat- 
ing constraints. “The objective is the minimum cost 
expansion plan given the base network configuration, the 
!:eneration facilities, and the forecasted demands for a 
larget year [ 11.” 
Traditionally, the transmission expansion planning 
problem has been studied using two types of techniques: 
( 1) techniques based on mathematical programming, such 
as Branch-and-Bound [2, 3,4],  and techniques based on 
sensitivity analysis [5, 61. There is a third technique that 
uses neural networks hybridized with genetic algorithms 
171, that has shown good performance. The combinatorial 
nature of the problem made a formidable task to pursue 
optimal solutions, making it very hard to find reasonable 
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solutions in short computational time. 
Since the initial PURPA regulations starting in 1992, the 
electric utility industry has been facing deregulation to 
allow transmission open access for suppliers and custom- 
ers. In the near future, transmission expansion planning 
will involve decisions taken by some of the actors in the 
expansion scenario (suppliers, customers, and/or transmis- 
sion line owners) that can and will affect decisions taken 
by other players. This intertwined decision process occurs 
when a new transmission line is built, and it is shared by 
several “players” of the expansion game. The decision 
whether to build the line or not, and the allocation of costs 
to the players who will use the line is still an open issue in 
a decentralized environment. 
Game theory (GT) is sometimes described as multiper- 
son decision theory or the analysis of conflict. One of the 
applications of GT has been the modeling of sustaining 
cooperation in apparently noncooperative environments 
through repeated interactions. As a modeling tool, cooper- 
ative GT has been successfully applied in the power sys- 
tems area to share the gains of regional cooperation in 
centralized planning investments [SI, to allocate wheeling 
transaction costs [9], or to allocate cost savings in an 
energy brokerage system [lo]. 
Research on Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) 
has focused on how coalitions are formed and on negotia- 
tion algorithms amongst players of economic games. Until 
now, the range of applications of DAI has been restricted 
to other fields not related to power systems planning: stock 
market trading [ 111, cooperative databases [ 121, and algo- 
rithmic theory [ 141. Cooperative game theory concepts 
have been used, but they were suited to decentralized mul- 
titask environments [ l l ,  12, 13, 14, 151. 
Given all that, we propose a combined GTDAI 
approach to transmission planning that addresses and 
solves the pending issues of transmission expansion in a 
deregulated electricity industry [21]: 
Implementing a negotiation algorithm 
Determining how coalitions are formed 
0885-8950/99/$10.00 0 1998 IEEE 
Allocating total expansion costs to every single agent 
of the transmission game 
These three issues are addressed in a deregulated envi- 
ronment by creating a'multi-agent system, where the play- 
ers cooperate with each other to achieve the optimal 
common expansion goal. Here the agents have to fulfill 
certain number of tasks, like adding new lines, and they 
want to cooperate forming coalitions to reduce overall 
costs. Each agent is rational, in the sense of being a utility 
maximizer, and is "an independently motivated agent, not 
willing to settle for a plan generated by a centralized plan- 
ner [ 1 11." 
11. NETWORK EXPANSION MODEL 
The objective of the mathematical model of a transmission 
expansion planning problem is minimizing the capital and 
operating costs associated with the system expansion over 
the planning horizon. The constraints associated with this 
model are the physical and economical constraints that are 
important when attempting to expand a utility system at a 
minimum cost, and yet meet all economic and demand 
restrictions that are placed upon the system. We can for- 
mulate the transmission expansion planning problem in 
the following terms: 
min cipGi + 4 ( z j - - 4  (1) 
ie Nb i e  A, 
where Ci is the cost per unit power at node i for the 
whole planning period, PG, is the real power injected into 
the network by generators at node i ,  Kj is the construc- 
tion investment cost per parallel link of linej, Zj is the 
variable representing the total number of parallel links of 
linej, < is the initial number of parallel links of linej, 
N g  is the set of generator nodes, and A,, is the set of pos- 
sible lines. 
Assuming a DC load flow model for simplicity, the 
problem is subject to the following constraints: 
(a) Power nodal balance at each bus, Kirchhoff's laws: 
where A is the node-branch incidence matrix, Tis the 
branch power flows vector, and P is the net power injec- 
tions vector. 
(b) Limits in branch power flow: 
where T,,, is the branch power flow limit vector. 
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Fig. 1. 6BusProblem 
In a DC load flow model, each element of the branch 
power flow vector Tin  constraint (2) can be described as 
follows: 
(4) 
where Zj is the variable representing the total number 
of parallel links of linej, xi is the reactance of a link of 
branch j and € I j  and 0, are the voltages angles of the ter- 
minal buses of branch j .  Then, constraint (2) becomes: 
B ( Z j ) .  0 = P ( 5 )  
where B(Zj)  is the susceptance matrix whose ele- 
ments are: B,, = - l / x k l  for the off-diagonal terms, and 
B,,= sum for  all 1 of B,, susceptances for the diagonal 
terms, xkl is the total reactance of branch (k,  l ) ,  1 E 52, 
are the branches connected to bus k ,  and 0 is the vector of 
nodal voltage angles. Finally, constraint (3) becomes: 
where BL is a diagonal matrix whose elements are: 
Zj/Xj . 
Let us illustrate the problem formulation by introducing 
the classical 6 bus system described by Garver in [2], as 
shown in Figure 1. We will use this simple example in the 
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Table 1: 6 Bus Test System Circuit Data 
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61 1.64 78 
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following sections to simulate coalition formation 
schemes and to allocate total expansion costs. 
We assume that transmission line cost is 1 monetary 
univmile. Its initial configuration has 5 nodes: 1, 2,  3, 4, 
and 5, and 6 branches: 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 2-3, 2-4, and 3-5, as 
shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. When the system expands, 
there is a new bus: bus 6, and 4 new possible rights-of- 
way: 2-6, 3-5, 4-6 and 5-6. The connection between any 
two buses is allowed with a limit of 4 parallel paths in 
each right-of-way. Data for existing and future lines in the 
system is given in Table 1, where the capacity of each line 
is determined based on thermal limitations and stability 
requirements. 
The solution obtained by Garver in [2 ]  without genera- 
tion rescheduling (generator outputs 1 , 3 ,  and 6 are 50, 165 
and 545 MW respectively) is shown in Figure 2 .  The 
arrows indicate the value and direction of the active power 
flow across the line(s). The optimal solution has a cost of 
200 monetary units, and circuit additions are: n26 = 4 Cir- 
cuits, n35 = 1 circuit, and n46 = 2 circuits as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Should we allow generation rescheduling, i.e. the real 
power generation ranging from 0 to the maximum genera- 
tion available (150, 360, and 600 MW respectively), the 
optimal solution had a cost of 130 monetary units, and cir- 
cuit additions are: n26 = 3 circuits, and n35 = 2 circuits. 
111. COALITIONS IN EXPANSION PLANNING 
In this section we are going to define what is the “game” 
that is played in a transmission expansion process (from a 
cooperative game theory standpoint), who are the players 
(agents’), and what is a coalition in transmission expan- 
sion planning. 
The purpose of the game is the expansion of the trans- 
mission network, with the minimum possible cost as in 
(l), subject to constraints given in (2), and (3), and with a 
“fair” allocation of the total cost among the agents. 
An agent in the game can be either a generator, a load, 
or an independent third party (for example, an independent 
company who owns transmission lines) that is physically 
attached to a bus. A typical agent in this context is 
regarded as an independent entity: a customer or group of 
customer loads, a generator or a set of generators, or a 
combination of both. For simplicity, we do not consider 
for now fractional bus loads or generators, although these 
would be the “atomic” agents -the minimal ones. We also 
assume that any set of generation units and loads attached 
to the same bus belong to a single agent. For our familiar 6 
bus example, we have a maximum of 6 agents, corre- 
sponding to the 6 generatiodload entities attached to the 
buses. 
A coalition of agents is a set of agents consisting of at 
least one generator, one load, and one transmission line. 
There are three axioms that a coalition has to satisfy: 
’ 
1. We will follow a Multi-Agent System (MAS) terminology, where 
players are called agents. 
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1.- Generator(s1 must meet the demand, i.e., the total gen- 
erator output in the coalition must be greater than or equal 
to the load. 
2.- New and existing line(s) thermal limits can not be 
exceeded when running a power flow for the new coali- 
tion. 
3.- There must be one or more transmission lines, either 
existing or possible candidates, connecting all the buses in 
the coalition. 
These three axioms create what we call autonomous 
coalitions, because they can try their own expansion plans 
without having to necessarily negotiate with any other 
similar entity. Figure 3 shows some examples of feasible 
autonomous coalitions for the 6 bus case. It can be antici- 
pated from the set of axioms that some of the possible coa- 
litions may be ruled out. In particular, if there is a single 
bus in the system, with either a generator, a load, or both, 
it can not be considered a coalition, because it lacks at 
least one transmission line. Nevertheless, we will assume 
that single agents will pay for line investments if neces- 
sary, so that it is not necessary for them to own transmis- 
sion lines at the beginning of the expansion game. Also, if 
two buses meet the first axiom, and there are no line candi- 
dates that can connect them, the second axiom is violated. 
Finally, if not all buses are in the coalition connected to 
each other, the third axiom is violated. 
UNITS r - - - - -  
240 
UNITS 
240 
Fig. 3. Examples of “autonomous” coalitions 
5 agents: [ 1,2,3,4,6}, { 1,2,3,5,6}, { 1,2,4,5,6}, and 
{2,3,4,5,6} 
grand coalition: [ 1,2,3,4,5,6} 
The other possible coalitions violate at least one of the 
axioms. 
IV. DECENTRALIZED COALITION FORMATION 
BETWEEN TRANSMISSION EXPANSION AGENTS 
The Shapley value [ 161 is a cooperative game theory solu- 
tion concept that calculates a fair division of a common 
utility (money, resources, etc.) among the members of a 
coalition. It can be defined as the weighted average of 
marginal contributions of a member to all possible coali- 
tions in which it may participate. It assumes that the game 
is superadditive, and that the grand coalition is formed. 
The mathematical expression of the Shapley value, oi , is 
given as follows: 
n 
1 1  
o i  = &j ~ [ v ( s ) - v ( s - i ) l  
q =  1 iE s 
where 
(7) 
i = player 
s = coalition of players 
q = size of a coalition 
n = total number of players 
v(q) = characteristic function (cost savings) associated 
with coalition q. 
c(q) = number of coalitions of size q containing the desig- 
nated player i, given by, 
( n  - I ) !  
c (q )  = ( n  - q ) ! ( q  - l ) !  
In order to avoid the exponential complexity of a Shap- 
ley value calculation, Ketchpel introduced the so-called 
Bilateral Shapley Value (BSV) [ 1 112. Klusch and Shehory 
[12, 131 adapted this approach for a completely decentral- 
ized and bilateral negotiation process among rational 
information agents using these values. In particular, the 
algorithm for coalition formation that they provided is also 
useful in the power transmission planning environment. 
Thus, to formulate our problem using BSVs, let us define 
our framework first. 
2. Similar work has been done by Kraus and Shehory [17]. In contrast to 
our work, they did not provide a solution for cooperative games and a 
given coalition structure with other than 2-agents coalitions. 
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Let CS L P ( A )  be a coalition structure on a given set of 
a.gents A = { a l ,  . . ., a, 1 , where Ci U Cj L A is a (bilat- 
eral) coalition of disjoint (n-agent) coalitions Ci and C, 
(:n 2 0) . The Bilateral Shapley Value for some coalition 
Ci in a bilateral coalition C is defined as 
coalitions C j  and C, are called founders of C , and v( C) 
denotes the self-value of coalition C ’. 
It can be seen that the founders will get half of their 
local contribution, and the other half stemming from coop- 
erative work with the other entity. The second term of the 
HSV expression reflects the strength of each agent con- 
cerning his contribution, therefore avoiding the “free- 
rider4” problem, so common in transmission expansion 
value allocation schemes. The BSV is a particular case of 
the Shapley value concept, because they create a fair dis- 
tribution of resources among two agents only. 
I ~ ~ ~ ! c , c , l ( C i )  := OSv(Ci)  + O S ( v ( C )  - ~ ( c j ) ) .  Both 
Our coalition formation method is based on the 
approach followed by Klusch and Shehory in [131. A sum- 
mary of the steps in the coalition formation process is 
given in the following subsections. 
A. Self-Calculation Phase 
Each individual agent gathers information to determine its 
self-cost. Calculation of the self-cost determines the mon- 
etary cost of line expansion for individual agents, follow- 
ing the three axioms from the previous section. It is 
possible that some of the players are unwilling to use new 
:.ines on their own, and this fact is reflected by a cost of 
zero. For the 6 bus example, where each individual agent 
IS attached to a bus, we can observe that agents 1 and 3 are 
self-sufficient, because the load is met by the existing bus 
generation. However, agents 2, 4, and 5 need to use extra 
lines to meet their own demand. Finally, agent 6 needs to 
be attached to the network, not to become isolated. These 
facts are reflected in their self-costs. In the case of differ- 
ent initial settings, agents 3 and 5 being a single initial 
agent for instance, costs would change, reflecting different 
initial conditions. 
B. Communication Phase 
Once each agent has calculated its own self-cost, it is time 
to determine the joint cost that he will have when cooper- 
ating with another agent. Unfortunately, an agent is not 
necessarily aware of the environment surrounding him, 
thus a coordinator is needed to gather this information. 
This is certainly the case of transmission expansion plan- 
ning, where the entire network is not known completely by 
3. Note that bsv{C, @)(C) = v ( C )  , and v ( 0 )  := 0 .  
4. The “free-rider’’ concept addresses the issue of new agents that take 
advantage of the work done by the existing ones without paying them any 
compensation. 
any player. In order to calculate the BSVs, the agents need 
to send all their proposed line addition(s) to this central 
figure, and then, receive the adequate number of new lines 
for requested coalitions, via messages sent by the coordi- 
nator to all of them. It is possible that two agents reach an 
agreement that is satisfactory to both of them, but detri- 
mental to the security of the system. That is why the role 
of an independent coordinator is needed to check network 
reliability and quality of service. Usually, a power flow 
subject to security constraints should be enough. On the 
other hand, agents freely exchange self-costs with each 
other. 
C. BSV Calculation Phase 
Now the agents know their own self-costs, and every pos- 
sible cost with other coalition partners via Step B. After 
getting these messages from the coordinator, they proceed 
to calculate BSVs if teaming with another agent. Then, the 
agents determine individually rational5 lists of preferred 
agents: ordered list of local agents’s BSVs for two-entity 
coalitions. These lists will change whenever step C is 
called again, with new multi-parties players acting as 
agents6. 
D. Bilateral Negotiation Phase 
Each agent looks at the head of his ordered list, and 
extends an offer to the preferred partner. The offer consists 
of sending the partner’s BSV: the value that he would 
attain for collaborating with the sender. If it happens that 
the sender receives also a message from the preferred part- 
ner, and they both find it is beneficial to join, they do. 
They create a multi-parties player that will behave like one 
agent from then on. Every other agent is also informed, for 
him to erase the members of the multi-parties players from 
his own preference list. 
The coalition formation process is repeated by all agents 
and multi-parties players, starting from Step B, until no 
more coalitions are possible. If no coalition is possible at 
one particular step, the agents look at the second best part- 
ner; if still not possible, to the third, etc., until reaching the 
end of the list. 
There are several features of this negotiation algorithm 
that are only relevant to expansion planning. First, this is a 
general (non superadditive) environment, thus the grand 
coalition will not necessarily be formed. Second, previous 
negotiation algorithms used a utilitarian coalition building 
scheme, where the agents have to satisfy their tasks via 
cooperation, thus increasing their benefits. The utilitarian 
5.  Individual rationality means that the agent wants to have a new value 
that is, at least, as good as the one that he could attain alone. 
6.  This means that the agents in the coalition will vote for a representa- 
tive agent that will be the spokesperson for this coalition in the future. 
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Coalition 
I21 
coalition formation in the transmission expansion domain 
is done in a cost-oriented view7. 
Note that even when common resources are shared (the 
lines), it does not mean that all agents can access all of 
them. In the case of multi-parties players, where load at 
bus 2 and generation at bus 6 form a single agent, we dis- 
regard all lines connecting agent 2-6 to other agents. For 
single agent expansion plans, the agent pays in full for all 
the lines that it needs to meet its own load at a minimum 
cost. 
cost Coalition cost 
90 (2561 334 
V. COST ALLOCATION METHOD: THE BACK- 
WARDS INDUCTION ALGORITHM 
Defining a coalition formation scheme is not enough to 
solve the transmission expansion game. Even if all agents 
agree on the final coalition arrangements, the issue of allo- 
cating the total cost among them remains yet unsolved. To 
address this issue we propose a solution (C, (xl, . . ., x,,)) 
for a given cooperative game ( A ,  v) in general environ- 
ments' using BSVs. Our method is based on a special 
a lgor i thmic  ca lcu la t ion  of each  agen t ' s  ut i l i ty  
x , ( i ~  (1, ..., m } )  which is not necessarily bsv, if 
ai E C, , andCk is a founder of C in the coalition struc- 
ture CS . In the following, we will denote coalitions with 
more than one agent as (multi-parties) players. 
To illustrate the algorithm, let us return to our familiar 6 
bus example whose coalition costs are given in Table 2. 
We will follow a backward induction algorithm method to 
calculate value (cost) allocations via BSVs. 
Starting from the grand coalition9, we divide the team 
into the two founding members: [ {  1-2-3-5-6},{4}], and 
split the total value (cost) of -130 (130). Let b ~ v { ~ , ~ ) ( i )  be 
the value allocated to agent i using the Bilateral Shapley 
Value rationale: 
bsV[12356,4)( 12356) = 1/2v({ 12356)) 4- 
1 / 2 ( ~ ( {  123456)) - ~ ( ( 4 ) ) )  (9) 
.bSV{12356,4](4) = 1/2v({4)) i- 
1 / 2 ( ~ ( {  123456)) - v ( {  12356))) (10) 
where v ( i )  is the value of coalition i , as per Table 2, 
when we reverse signs. Going backwards one more step, 
we find the following values for the next subdivision of 
[{ 1-2-3-56}] into their founders [ {  l } ]  and [{2-3-56)]: 
7. Related work can be found in the DAI area for task-oriented domains 
with cost functions by Rosenschein and Zlotkin. 
8. General environments allow for both, superadditive as well as subad- 
ditive games. A game ( A , v )  is superadditive iff 
VC = C1 u C  c P ( A ) :  v(C)2v(CI)+v(C2);itissubadditiveiffit 
.2. - is not superaddihve. 
9. See Section VI: Simulation Results 
bSv{1,23.56)(1) = 1/2V({1})+ 
1/2(bsv{l, 2356}(12356) - v({2356))) (11) 
1/2(bsv~l,2,56,(12356) - v({ l ) ) )  (12) 
bsV.r,,23yj1(2356) = 1/2~({2356}) t 
The process is followed until the values for individual 
agents are found: (12.5, -49.375, 10.625, -55, -29.375, - 
19.375), adding up to -130 total final value. Note that in 
the second and subsequent steps of the backward algo- 
rithm, the total value to split is given by the previous Bilat- 
eral Shapley Value, as shown in [ l l ]  and [12], by using 
bSV{1,2356)( 12356) instead of v({ 12356)). This back- 
ward process can be used as a general calculation scheme 
for every agent utility in its coalition. Figure 4 illustrates 
the cost allocation process step-by-step. 
I I 
b s v = - 7 t ,  '> =-55 
1-2-3-5-6 
d b  2-3-5-6 bsvd37.5 
Fig. 4. Cost allocation results using backwards induction 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We have run a coalition formation simulation for the 6 bus 
test case implementing the Bilateral Negotiation algo- 
rithm. Cost functions are shown in Table 2. Note that 
when using SVs and BSVs, values are negative to reflect 
positive expansion costs in monetary units. Note also that 
the respective coalition values of this (subadditive) game 
are negative, reflecting the utility of a coalition in a cost- 
oriented view". 
Table 2: Coalition Expansion Costs 
~~ 
10. E.g., the value (cost) for the grand coalition is -130 (130) 
11.50 
The first simulation starts with the individual agents 1 to 
6 creating lists of preferences. We assume for the first two 
simulations that whenever a tie occurs between going solo 
or teaming, teaming is preferred. The final resulting coali- 
tion is { 1,2,3,4,5,6}, and the order of coalition creation is 
the following: [ l ,  (2-6),  {3-5}, 41 in the first round, [ l ,  
{ 2-3-56),  41 in the second, [ ( 1-2-3-56}, 41 in the third, 
and [{  1-2-3-4-56}] in the fourth and last round. Once the 
grand coalition is created, we follow a “backwards induc- 
tion” method to calculate cost allocations via BSvs. Start- 
ing from the grand coalition, we divide the team into the 
two founding members: [ { 1-2-3-5-61, 41, and split the 
total cost of 130 in two, using the values from Table 2. 
The process is followed until the costs for individual 
agents are found: (12.5, -49.375, 10.625, -55, -29.375, - 
19.375), adding up to -130 total. 
A second simulation is run, since player 6 is indifferent 
to team with 2 or 4 at the beginning. The process is now: 
6)]. The cost allocation is given by: (21.25, -49.375, 6.25, 
Note that not all simulations drive the coalition to a 
grand coalition scheme. Here is one example: [ l ,  (2-6}, 3, 
allocation is still up to 130: (22.5,-48.75,15,-60,-40,- 
18.75). 
Were we using a central planner, we would not need a 
synchronized and decentralized algorithm. A central coor- 
[ l ,  2, (3-5}, {4-6}] -> [(l-3-51, I2-4-611 -> [(1-2-3-4-5- 
-55, -33.75, -19.375). 
4, 51 -> [ {  1-2-6}, 3, 4, 51 -> [ {  1-2-3-6), 4, 51. But cost 
dinator would calculate the Shapley values for all agents, 
given the costs in Table 2. These should be the allocation 
results: (16.85, -45.86, 54.73, -19.41, -42.48, -93.81). 
Comparing with the BSV results, we observe a clear mis- 
match in buses 3 and 6 allocations. The reason is that SVS 
are only good tools for a superadditive environment where 
the grand coalition is always formed, which is not the 
case. SVs consider all possible combinations of players, 
good and bad. By using BSVs, only the best combinations 
of players will form, and this will be reflect in the final 
allocation. 
So far, we have considered players that belong to the 
network. But, in a deregulated environment, we have to 
consider players that just invest money in building lines, 
and want to recover that investment. This is the case of 
third party transmission line owners. For the sake of the 
example, suppose that line 2-6 belongs to a party that does 
not own anything else in the network. These are the steps 
that a decentralized algorithm would follow for the line 
owner to recover her investment: 
1) Determine if the line is beneficial for the entire net- 
work. The coordinator runs a transmission line expansion. 
2) If the line is beneficial, run the coalition formation 
algorithm. 
3) Recover part, or all investment costs, from the parties 
that are directly using the line: players 2 and 6. If they do 
not provide enough, distribute the remaining costs among 
the other players in a fair manner (for example, splitting 
them in equal parts). 
For all simulations, buses 1 and 3 receive monetary 
units for their contribution to the welfare of the system, 
while the remaining buses must contribute, although less 
that what they would pay on their own. This is a clear 
incentive for all players to play this game. 
VII. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
The network expansion program has been coded in Scilab, 
a software platform similar to MATLAB@” and devel- 
oped at INRIA [ 181. 
Mathematica@12 is the cost allocation software that has 
been used for this project. The interested reader is referred 
to Chapter 8 of [ 191 for implementation details. 
Towards an implementation of Transmission Planning 
Agents, an Interactive Development Environment for the 
specijication and simulation of Agent Systems IDEAS [ 121 
has been recently implemented on a network of Sun work- 
stations. IDEAS runs under an X-Windows environments 
11.  MATLAB is a registered trademark of The Mathworks, Inc. 
12. Muthemuticu is a registered trademark of Wolfram Research, 
Inc. 
and uses Tcl/Tk, C and Prolog to simulate agents’ actions, 
communication and agents’ beliefs respectively. At the 
current time, an implementation of the coalition formation 
and negotiation process is being tested for the 6 bus sys- 
tem. Due to its modularity, IDEAS is perfectly suitable to 
be embedded in other software environments, or work as a 
stand alone program. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a new application of decentral- 
ized coalition formation and cooperative cost allocation in 
the power systems transmission planning area. A simple 
heuristic transmission planning problem has been used to 
calculate costs for different expansion coalitions. These 
coalitions have been chosen by introducing two new con- 
cepts. First, an “autonomous” coalition set of players has 
been defined. Second, the concept of “natural” coalition 
sets has been introduced. A simple 6 bus case has been 
analyzed using centralized cost allocation techniques, 
based on SVs, and Distributed Artificial Intelligence 
(DAI) game theory concepts, like the BSVs. Results on 
both areas have been presented and analyzed. 
We acknowledge that such a simple example is just a 
first step in the way to understand cost allocation in a 
decentralized environment. Future work will refine coali- 
tion formation schemes, analyze coalition stability, and 
will explore classical Game Theory concepts, like the ker- 
nel, applied to decentralized expansion games. 
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